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The Central and Eastern European (CEE) capital markets (of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine and, to a limited extent, Belarus) are gradually evolving 
towards increased breadth (diversity) and depth (liquidity), however, they are still exposed to 
considerable cross-country volatility and interdependence spill-overs – especially in times of capital 
flight to more established asset classes (“safe havens”). Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have 
widely been censured for their undesirable political interference and chronic operational opacity. 
This paper demonstrates that in CEE, contrary to widespread perceptions attributable to developed 
markets, SWFs can act as natural and powerful risk mitigators (contributing to a more stable capital 
base and reduced systemic volatility). Such a proposition is premised on several factors specific 
to SWFs oriented to CEE. They comprise: strategic long-termism and patience in overcoming 
interim pricing deficiencies, commitments to elements of a broadly interpreted infrastructure, and 
absence of overt conflicts of interest with the CEE host economies. The paper, besides reviewing 
the utilitarianism of SWFs in the CEE’s risk mitigation context, highlights regulatory and technical 
barriers to more SWF funding for CEE. It also recommends policy measures to the CEE economies 
aimed at luring more host-friendly SWF investment into the region.
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The paper, dealing with the current status of 
sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investments in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), besides a review of relevant 
literature, is making recourse to empirical data on 
transactions concluded by global SWFs in CEE. This 
research project has been financed from the resources 
of the Polish National Science Centre (awarded under 
Decision No. DEC-2012/07/B/HS5/03797).
SWFs rank at the top of institutional alternative 
managers globally, yet their activity has not been 
comprehensively addressed in international academic 
research. Practically no major publication to date has 
focused on a catalogue of SWF investment in CEE. This 
endeavour is expected to commence a series of studies 
specifically devoted to SWF investment potential in the 
CEE region. 
Owing to the lack of explicit information disclosure 
requirements routinely imposed on SWFs and their 
limited accountability to financial institutions (let alone 
retail investors or the public at large), SWFs are widely 
perceived as relatively opaque (even among alternative 
investment managers, such as hedge, private equity 
and exchange traded funds). Even more obscure is their 
investment activity in the CEE emerging economies, 
which are still evolving and opening up to international 
competition, are of local or regional significance (at best) 
and are equipped with relatively undiversified, illiquid 
and nebulous financial industries. 
This research study (primarily focused on CEE) is 
based on empirical data garnered from the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute Transaction Database: arguably 
the most comprehensive and authoritative resource 
tracking SWF investment behaviour globally. The findings 
contained herein indicate low penetration of CEE by 
global SWFs. Nevertheless, this observation comes with 
a few important caveats:
1) capital in transit: SWF, particularly those 
involved in infrastructural or real estate investment 
projects, often operate through special purpose entities 
(SPEs), which complicates the identification of their 
beneficial ownership or accurate and timely portfolio 
compositions,
2) multinationals: CEE economies are still peripheral 
to those of more developed European countries, which 
has far-reaching implications for capital sourcing (funding 
ultimately reallocated to the region is usually originated 
outside CEE: at pan-group level, resulting in  cost or fiscal 
efficiencies),
3) limited sovereign transparency: the CEE 
economies in general represent lower standards of 
business transparency, which is likely to distort the deal 
flows (unless they are reported on the donor side.
Mindful of these constraints and comparing 
SWF activity in CEE with that identified in the donor 
countries, it can safely be assumed that this empirical 
research – although not free from error – is sufficiently 
representative to enable the postulation of tentative 
conclusions.
The proposed research is interdisciplinary in scope: 
combining identifiable traces of investment behaviour of 
SWFs in CEE with an overview of motives embraced by 
global SWFs and relating them to the CEE context. To the 
best knowledge of the paper’s authors, such an attempt 
is a pioneering effort, and is expected to initiate a debate 
on the current and envisaged roles played by SWFs in the 
CEE region.
SWFs, commanding a pool of assets under 
management estimated at US$ 6.3 trillion (SWF Institute, 
2013), currently represent the premier class of alternative 
investment globally. In 2008 through 2012, SWF assets 
grew by about 60% (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
[SWFI], 2013). To put this number in perspective, the 
much-touted hedge fund industry has a paltry US$ 2.63 
trillion under management – including some assets 
originating from SWFs (Hedge Fund Research, Inc. [HFR], 
2013). The rapid expansion of SWFs has mirrored a more 
profound geopolitical shift of gravity clearly discernible 
since the beginning of the 21st century: that of emerging 
economies morphing from world debtors to world 
creditors (Toloui, 2007; Mezzcapo, 2009). Despite a 
relatively high degree of functional opacity attributable to 
numerous SWFs (Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, 
2014), their stellar rise and multifaceted ramifications for 
global financial markets and underlying real economies 
have not entirely eluded scholarly attention and political 
debate.
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Truman (2010), in his pioneering work on SWFs, 
concluded that SWFs “are here to stay”, i.e. had 
become a permanent element of the global financial 
landscape. Therefore the question arises: are they 
a socioeconomic asset or liability from the global 
perspective? Academics, experts and politicians paint 
a picture that is a mixture of hope and apprehension. 
Truman and others (e.g. Weiner, 2011; Csurgai, 
2011) highlight concerns regarding SWF activity. One 
of such hazards, the pursuit of political and economic 
power by countries managing large SWFs, appears 
to be particularly important. Theoretically, as state 
sponsored actors, SWFs can be used by their mandators 
for politically driven purposes, potentially harmful for 
their recipient countries. Even Barack Obama, during his 
initial presidential campaign in 2008 commented: “I am 
obviously concerned if these… sovereign wealth funds are 
motivated by more than just market consideration and 
that’s obviously a possibility” (Lixia, 2010). In reply to such 
publicly voiced concerns, many scholars have endeavoured 
to assess to what extent SWFs follow investment 
strategies driven primarily by financial efficiencies 
and to what degree they respond to political agendas. 
Interestingly, depending on the methodologies and time 
periods applied, varying conclusions come to the fore. 
Balding’s (2008) analysis of foreign and private 
equity transactions undertaken by flagship SWFs, 
pointed to an absence of non-economic investment 
motives. Balding thus construed SWF policies to follow 
the path of expected investment efficiency. Lixia (2010) 
argued that anti-SWF concerns arise mainly from the 
lack of understanding of SWFs’ role and Lixia’s research 
showed no clear evidence of funds acting out of purely 
political motives. However, other researchers (Knill, Lee 
& Mauck, 2012; Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2008) argue 
that SWF investment policies are not entirely driven by 
profit maximizing objectives and may include political 
motivation. Clark and Monk (2012) even go so far as 
defining SWFs as “long-term investors, whose holdings 
are selected on the basis of their strategic interests 
(fund and nation) rather than the principles of modern 
portfolio theory”. This definition makes an important 
distinction between the owner and the fund itself 
suggesting that sometimes the ruling elites of a country 
and its fund managers might have conflicting interests. 
Pistor (2010) observed that the overriding 
objective of SWFs is to maximize the gains of the ruling 
elite in the SWFs’ home countries. She thus posited 
that “SWFs are market investors seeking the highest 
returns when it suits their overall objective of insuring 
the ruling elites in their home countries, however, they 
are willing to depart from this strategy if and when 
circumstances pose threats to the systems they serve.”
Some funds are overt in manifesting their non-
financial sensitivities. For example Norway’s Government 
Pension Fund – Global, the largest SWF to operate globally 
(SWFI Rankings, 2014), is permitted to invest in targets 
as long as they will satisfy predefined environmental, 
labour or transparency standards (Chesterman, 2008; 
Clark, Dixon & Monk, 2013), a form of ethical pre-
screening (Social Funds, 2014). That obviously politically-
biased behaviour may put them at a disadvantage to 
purely market-driven collective investment schemes. 
Some scholars have even pointed to the existence of 
an SWF-relevant discount in investee equity values vs. 
the entry of other relatively non-politicised (especially 
privately owned) institutions (e.g. Bortolotti et al., 2015). 
A similarly nuanced and empirically borne out impact on 
SWF target company values was also adduced by Grira 
(Grira, 2014).
Thus, no clear consensus exists in academic 
literature as to whether SWFs’ investment strategies 
are solely based on financial objectives and whether 
they are specifically geared to exert a hands-on effect 
on corporate value. This trait is expected to be highly 
fund specific and any pan-industrial conclusions would 
be highly precarious to draw. However, it would be 
equally difficult not to concur with Truman (2010) who 
claimed that “SWFs are political by virtue of how they 
are established, and by their nature are influenced to 
some degree by political considerations”.
In consequence of their (at least fractional) political 
sensitivities, the question is whether SWFs contribute to 
capital market volatility or if they can (potentially) act 
as market stabilizers. Research on this topic is rapidly 
expanding alongside SWFs’ rising visibility on global 
financial markets. A few stylised facts can be derived 
from this ongoing debate.
Firstly, SWFs’ distinctive features make them 
natural market stabilizers. Mezzcapo (2009) claims that 
the presence of committed investors (such as SWFs) 
should be considered beneficial, as they are typically: 
relatively large, highly liquid, long term orientated, not 
significantly leveraged, with a substantial appetite for 
risk, less sensitive to market conditions (than other 
institutional investors) and focused on global portfolio 
diversification in search for superior returns. Due to such 
characteristics, SWFs can  promote stability in the global 
financial market. Moreover, as counterintuitive as this 
may appear, the limited transparency of numerous SWFs 
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may additionally ease pressure on their short term 
(interim) performance. Since SWFs are not widely 
accountable for their investment performance, the risk 
that dramatic short-term losses become a politically 
sensitive topic and set off a knee-jerk reaction by their 
managers is thereby minimised. 
Secondly, companies tend to profit from SWF 
investments in a variety of ways. Fernandes’ (2009) 
research on SWF portfolio activities in 2002-2007 
demonstrated that the funds had preferred large and 
profitable corporate targets and that capital markets 
had placed a high premium on SWF co-investment 
(such a premium had come up to 20%). Such favourable 
market reactions to SWFs’ entry announcements 
corroborated the findings of Kotter and Lel (2008). The 
evidence from Fernandes’ paper also implied that SWFs 
generally neither had aimed at taking active control over 
companies, nor had harmed the targets and had not 
aggressively procured inside information or technology. 
The overall conclusion was that the target firms generally 
outperform (their peers not backed by SWFs) and that 
they command higher valuations when SWFs come in.
Thirdly, SWFs generally replicate investment 
practices of other established classes of institutional 
investors (such as public pension-, mutual- or hedge 
funds). Kotter and Lel (2011) inferred that SWF behaviour 
mirrors that of other institutional investors in their 
preference for target characteristics and in their impact 
on target firm performance. Similarities to mutual funds 
were proved by Avendaño and Santiso (2012) who 
claimed that despite contrasts in portfolio allocation, 
the two types of collective investment schemes do not 
radically differ in their investment routines. 
Fourthly, Fernandes (2009) argued that SWFS have 
the potential to play a stabilising role on worldwide 
capital markets because they serve as the “buyers-
of-last-resort” when markets are falling. Despite their 
heavy losses sustained during the global financial crisis 
of 2008 (Kunzel, Lu, Petrowa & Pihlman, 2010), and their 
domestic bias (during the liquidity crunch SWFs assisted 
in providing liquidity for their home markets), the funds 
did not refrain from international lending. For certain 
cash-strapped companies in the West, they turned out 
to be veritable “white knights” – friendly investors that 
despite unprecedented risks moved to salvage distressed 
businesses. Couturier et al. (2009) cite the example of 
Barclays, which whilst on the verge of bankruptcy secured 
a financial bailout from the Abu Dhabi International 
Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), although limited
information disclosure was made available at the time 
and certain conditions of the bailout are now deemed 
onerous.
In a broader context, the SWFs’ readiness to invest 
counter-cyclically (most financial institutions obligated 
by frequent portfolio valuations tend to be pro-cyclical) 
is per se a risk mitigation factor.
Finally, no evidence substantiates SWFs’ purported 
penchant for endeavouring to destabilize capital markets. 
Sun and Hesse (2009) even tried to prove the opposite: 
in their study they  concluded that no discovery of any 
tangible destabilising effect by SWFs on equity markets 
had ever been made – at least in the short term. Obviously, 
they stressed that any comprehensive assessment of 
the longer-term impact of SWF investments and their 
potentially stabilizing role would require more in-depth 
research but thus far SWFs had behaved “responsibly”. 
Reflecting on SWFs from the perspective of political 
science, one can perceive them as state-controlled entities 
that (by definition) are instruments of state-sponsored 
foreign policy. As Gilpin (2001) noted, even in the context 
of “a highly integrated global economy, states continue 
to use their power … to channel economic forces in ways 
favourable to their own national interests”.
By leveraging a SWF, a country can increase 
its geopolitical sway, exercise control over strategic 
resources, gain access to privileged technological and 
military know-how, facilitate espionage or sabotage of 
sensitive enterprises or infrastructure, but it can also 
promote sustainable development or gender equality 
(Steinitz, 2012). In other words, SWFs’ stabilising/
destabilising inclinations are a function of their sponsoring 
states. Consequently, it is instructive to analyse the 
manifest or covert interests and political strategies of 
countries exerting control over specific SWFs – and not 
funds as such. In one set of circumstances a given SWF 
can contribute to financial stability but in another the 
very same SWF can foment a hostile political strategy of 
its state. 
As far as the SWFs presence in the region is 
concerned, there is a conspicuous lack of accurate data. 
SWF activities in CEE, unlike other types of collective 
investment schemes involved in alternative assets (e.g. 
hedge, private equity and exchange-traded funds), have 
not yet been comprehensively analysed in terms of impact 
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Table 1: Breakdown of SWF investments in CEE by country as at 31 July 2014
Table 2: Breakdown of SWF investments in CEE by SWF institution as at 31 July 2014
Source: Own calculations based on available media sources, Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute data feeds and SWF official information disclosure.
Country
Number 
of investments
Value of 
investments 
(in US$m)
% of total SWF 
investments in 
CEE
Czech Republic 6 1325 16,4%
Estonia 1 16 0,2%
Hungary 11 889,22 11,0%
Lithuania 2 94 1,2%
Poland 86 5455 67,6%
Slovakia 1 287,73 3,6%
Total  107 8067 100,0% 
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on financial markets. CEE is not identifiable from either 
“Europe” or “emerging markets” in most publications 
showing regional distribution of SWF investments (e.g. 
Castelli & Scacciavillani, 2012). As a result, academic 
literature on SWFs lacks precise coverage of  the value 
and structure of SWF investments in the CEE countries. 
The use of the SWF Institute Transaction Database has 
thus been complemented by media reports on SWF 
investment activity in the region.  As displayed in Table 1 
below, the total SWF investments in CEE can be estimated
at a lacklustre US$ 10bn (accounting for transactions 
whose value has not been officially disclosed and possibly 
other financial commitments uncovered by all major 
databases). The lion’s share (over two-thirds by value 
and by number) of the investments has been earmarked 
for Poland, the largest economy in CEE. The Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund – Global accounts for the bulk 
of all SWF investments committed to CEE, commanding 
over three-quarters of the pan-CEE total by investment 
value. Its competitive position is shown in Table 2. 
SWF
Investments 
in CEE
% of total SWF  
investments in CEE
Targeted Sectors
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Corporation (ADIC)
156 1,9% Real Estate
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
1000 12,4%
Healthcare, Satellite 
Communications
China State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
n/a n/a Real Estate
Goverment Investment 
Corporation (GIC)
330,22 4,1% Infrastructure
Government Pension Fund 
Global (GPFG)
6160 76,4% T-bonds
Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA)
421 5,2% Real Estate
Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA)
n/a n/a Real Estate
Source: Own calculations based on available media sources, Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute data feeds and SWF official information disclosure.
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Tabela 3: Top global SWFs’ asset allocation vs. CEE oriented SWFs’ asset allocation as at 31 July 2014
The relatively insubstantial value of SWF investments 
in CEE and the lopsided exposure of the world’s biggest 
SWFs to the region (especially the significant disparity 
between Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global 
exposure and the activity of the likes of Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority or China Investment Corporation) 
may partially be explained by the limited depth and 
breadth of the CEE capital markets. CEE’s financial sectors 
are much less liquid (e.g. if measured via lending to the 
private sector or stock market capitalisations related to 
GDP or per capita) than developed financial industries, 
which renders equity listed in CEE by far less approachable 
to large, globally active and diversified financial 
players (the hallmarks of SWF activity). This relative 
unattractiveness of CEE financial markets is also reflected 
by a lower degree of their overall “financialisation”, as 
defined by T. I. Palley (2007) to represent “a process 
whereby financial markets, financial institutions, and 
financial elites gain greater influence over economic 
policy and economic outcomes”. The aforementioned 
factors put together help to explain why the current 
edition of the most comprehensive benchmarking study 
of financial market competitiveness (the Global Financial 
Centres Index 15, 2014) ranks Warsaw only 60th, Prague 
75th, Budapest 77th, and Tallinn 81st worldwide (with 
Vilnius and Bratislava not even meriting a mention).
The limited overall penetration of CEE by global 
SWFs (recapitulated in Appendix 1) is also noteworthy 
in the context of SWF investment distribution across 
industries or individual companies. 
Furthermore, SWFs thus far active in CEE come 
from donors that have no international disputes 
with any of the CEE host countries, whereas Norway 
(a NATO member and operator of the largest global SWF 
with notable exposure to CEE) is politically allied with all 
the CEE host countries (CIA Factbook, 2014). Additionally, 
given the concentrated structure of CEE-bound foreign 
direct or indirect investment inflows, the arrival of 
Middle Eastern or East Asian SWF investment inflows 
can be hailed as a welcome diversification measure and, 
prospectively, a convenient entryway to more potential 
investment (in various forms). …Similarly, the breakdown 
of SWF investment in CEE by asset class shows that the 
SWFs currently present in this region predominantly 
focus on Government/Treasury bonds, infrastructural 
and real estate projects (Table 3). In view of pressing 
budgetary exigencies and relative underdevelopment 
of the infrastructural and real estate sectors in this 
region, such involvement can be construed as highly 
beneficial to the host economies (thereby partially filling 
a void left out by the shallow domestic funding sources 
and counterbalancing a general dearth of inbound 
international capital). Such an interpretation of SWF 
behaviour is based on the traditional neorealist paradigm 
established in political science (Lenihan, 2013) and useful 
in explaining the particular role of SWFs in stabilising 
the CEE capital markets. We can thus assume that SWF 
activities in the region could be potentially harmful only 
if the donor state were to demonstrate explainable 
interests in destabilising the CEE financial markets and 
the scale of involvement were to be material. As for the 
first prerequisite, among all the largest SWFs owners only 
Russia and Norway are deeply politically involved in the 
CEE region. From the two, only Russia may have political 
interests in destabilising CEE countries – because of its 
geopolitical ambitions (Fedorov, 2013).
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GPFG ADIA CIC GIC SWFs in CEE
Equities 60% 43% - 67% 40% 35% - 50% 32%
T-Bonds/Fixed income 35% - 40% 10% - 20% 17% 29% - 36% 56%
Credit instruments - 5% - 10% - - 0,5%
Alternative assets - 5% - 10% 11,8% - -
Real estate 5% 5% - 10%
28,2%
9% - 13% 5%
Private equity - 2% - 8% 11% - 15% -
Infrastructure - 1% - 5% - 7%
Cash and related instruments - 0% - 10% 2,6% - -
Source: Own calculations based on available media sources, Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute data feeds and SWF official information disclosure.
However, the assets of Russian SWFs have been 
largely reabsorbed domestically and cannot be used as an 
effective instrument of economic statecraft (Shemirani, 
2011). Sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, a host of 
other countries and international organisations have 
prompted the Kremlin to fall back on the SWFs’ assets 
to shore up the cash-strapped national budget and the 
wobbly Russian rouble (Flood, 2015).  
The political involvement of China, Singapore or the 
Gulf states in CEE is highly limited. Consequently, they do 
not have vital national interests in the region that could 
potentially validate hostile manoeuvring via SWFs. 
Neither does the second precondition (material 
impact on the CEE host economies or targets), as 
aforementioned, indicate imminent potential for adverse 
political ramifications.
Given the empirical data under review, no direct, 
noxious effects can be attributed to SWFs operating in 
CEE. Conversely, the CEE economies stand to gain from a 
higher influx of SWF investment in the following ways:
1) funding diversification: financing sources 
accessible to the CEE economies are still relatively scarce, 
inefficient and narrow – ongoing, rising commitments 
from SWFs are poised to play an important role in 
enriching the selection of investors available to CEE, 
thereby mitigating the “hot money” ebbs and flows 
affecting the region,
2) complementary character: given SWF’s 
emphasis on investment projects whose payback 
horizons are remote and the prevalent short-termism 
of most financing sources established in CEE, SWFs are
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likely to embrace investment opportunities hardly 
acceptable to other investor classes,
3) risk absorption: the distinctive character of SWF 
investment patterns globally (risk tolerance, extended 
investment horizons, countercyclical behaviour) makes 
them particularly well suited to stabilize CEE financial 
markets – insufficiently bolstered by institutional 
capital.
To further tap global SWFs, CEE will have to reform 
its institutions in several ways, of which the most 
important are:
1) broader and deeper financial centres: evidently, 
SWFs active in CEE are under-represented in the public 
equity domain – to attract more SWF activity the CEE 
financial industries have to evolve towards more breadth 
(diversity of investible assets) and depth (predictable 
liquidity),
2) deregulation and active origination: the CEE 
countries need to deregulate foreign direct investment/
capital controls and establish sustainable mechanisms for 
soliciting SWF business (i.a. through teams of committed 
and skilled professionals),
3) investor friendliness: given the origins of 
numerous SWF operations (the Middle East and East 
Asia) the CEE host countries should, on the one hand, 
refrain from political initiatives disapproved by the 
donors, and, on the other, foster socioeconomic and 
cultural proximities to these areas.
A great deal more cross-disciplinary research needs 
to be conducted to fully illustrate dilemmas related to the 
prospects of large-scale and sustainable SWF investment 
in CEE. This pioneering attempt will (as fervently hoped 
by the authors) serve as a convenient prelude to a 
multifaceted debate on the envisaged and desirable role 
of future SWF investment in the region.
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Country of the 
Target Entity
Acquiror Entity
Final  
Transaction Date  
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Investment 
Type
Transaction 
Amount 
(US$m)
% stake 
acquired
Target  
Industry
Czech Republic 
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a bonds 23 - Infrastructure
Czech Republic
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a bonds 69 - Energy
Czech Republic
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a listed equity 71 0.49% Energy
Czech Republic
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a T-bonds 1004 - -
Czech Republic
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a listed equity 36 0.42% Financials
Czech Republic
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
31.12.2013 listed equity 2 0.54% Telecommunication 
Services
Czech Republic
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority
n/a
unlisted 
equity
120 50.00% Real Estate
Estonia
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a bonds 16 - Energy
Hungary
Government 
Investment 
Corporation
07.06.2007
unlisted 
equity
330.22 17.38% Infrastructure
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a T-bonds 323 - -
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a bonds 49 - Financials
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
31.12.2013 listed equity 1 2.59% Industrials
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
31.12.2013 listed equity 19 1.94%
Telecommunic-ation 
Services
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
31.12.2013 listed equity 27 0.72% Healthcare
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a listed equity 0.7 0.94% Financials
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a listed equity 0.1 0.18%
Information 
Technology
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a listed equity 71 0.97% Energy
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a listed equity 68 1.24% Financials
Hungary
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a listed equity 0.2 0.29%
Consumer 
Discretionary
Lithuania
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a listed equity 3 2.77% Aerospace
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Lithuania
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a T-bonds 91 - -
Poland
Abu Dhabi 
 Investment 
Authority
n/a listed equity n/a n/a n/a
Poland
Kuwait Investment 
Authority
n/a
listed, 
unlisted 
equity
400 n/a n/a, Real Estate
Poland
Government 
Investment 
Corporation
n/a n/a n/a n/a Financials
Poland
Abu Dhabi 
 Investment 
Authority
05.22.2013
credit 
granting
35 - Real Estate
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a T-bonds 2826 - -
Poland
Qatar Investment 
Authority
xx.11.2013
unlisted 
equity
n/a n/a Real Estate
Poland
China State 
Administration of 
Foreign Exchange
xx.09.2013
unlisted 
equity
n/a n/a Real Estate
Poland
Kuwait Investment 
Authority
10.18.2007
unlisted 
equity
21 n/a Real Estate
Poland
China Investment 
Corporation
n/a listed equity 1000 n/a
Healthcare, Satellite 
Communications
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 476 - Financials
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 127 -
Consumer 
Discretionary
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 20 - Consumer Staples
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 223 - Energy
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 7 - Healthcare
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 152 - Industrials
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 38 - Information 
Technology
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 50 - Materials
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 21 -
Telecommunication 
Services
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 44 - Real Estate
Poland
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
- listed equity 15 - Utilities
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Slovakia
Government Pension 
Fund - Global
n/a T-bonds 287 - -
Slovakia
Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority
09.28.2006
unlisted 
equity
0.7 - Real Estate
Slovakia
Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority
08.17.2009
unlisted 
equity
0,03 - Real Estate
Total 8 067
Source: Own calculations based on Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute Transaction Database datasets 
 (available online at: http://www.swftransaction.com/) [31.07.2014], target company names may be communicated  
(upon request to the Authors), note: “xx” indicates the unavailability of exact transaction dates.
